

[Discussion Draft]

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 117–54

OFFERED BY MR. DEUTCH OF FLORIDA

At the end of division E, add the following:

**TITLE LIX—LIBYA
STABILIZATION ACT**

SEC. 5901. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the “Libya Stabilization Act”.

SEC. 5902. FINDINGS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The stability and territorial unity of Libya is critical to the security of the United States, Europe, North Africa, and the Sahel, as well as maritime routes in the southern Mediterranean Sea.

(2) In April 2022, the United States identified Libya as a partner country for the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (Public Law 116–94).

(3) United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has identified countering the encroachment of Russia and China along NATO’s southern

1 flank as a “top focus” and has worked to support
2 diplomatic efforts to reconstitute the Libyan state
3 and to monitor and disrupt terrorist organizations
4 and Russian aspirations for establishing a perma-
5 nent security foothold in the country.

6 (4) As of February 2020, the Defense Intel-
7 ligence Agency determined that the Islamic State in
8 Libya (ISIS-Libya) had been “de-graded.” However,
9 AFRICOM continued to “keep pressure on ISIS and
10 other violent extremist organizations as they seek to
11 take advantage of the security vacuum created by
12 the civil war in Libya.”.

13 (5) According to the United Nations, fighting in
14 Libya during 2019 and 2020 led to the deaths of
15 more than 500 civilians and the displacement of
16 more than 200,000 people.

17 (6) Parties to the conflict in Libya have killed
18 civilians, committed torture and abuse, committed
19 mass extrajudicial killings, requisitioned the houses
20 of civilians, targeted medical facilities, and blocked
21 humanitarian access to food, health, and other life-
22 saving services, worsening humanitarian conditions.

23 (7) According to the United Nations Office for
24 the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as of
25 April 2022, more than 635,000 migrants and refu-

1 gees remained in Libya and the U.N. Secretary-Gen-
2 eral reported in January 2022 that migrants and
3 refugees “continued to face heightened risks of rape,
4 sexual harassment and trafficking by armed groups,
5 transnational smugglers and traffickers, and officials
6 from the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migra-
7 tion, which operates under the Ministry of Inte-
8 rior.”. Migrants and refugees, including women and
9 children, are routinely subjected to discrimination,
10 arrest, arbitrary detention, torture and other human
11 rights violations and abuses. The United Nations
12 has called for the immediate release, evacuation, and
13 protection of refugees and migrants detained in con-
14 flict zones.

15 (8) According to the International Organization
16 for Migration, in 2021, more than 32,400 migrants
17 were intercepted or rescued at sea and returned to
18 Libya, and 1,553 migrants lost their lives or went
19 missing while attempting to cross the Mediterra-
20 nean, highlighting the vulnerable position of non-
21 Libyan migrants who are either subject to detention
22 and abuses in Libya or are forced to undertake un-
23 safe attempts to reach Europe.

24 (9) In November 2019, the Government of the
25 National Accord (GNA) and the Government of Tur-

1 key signed a Memorandum of Understanding on
2 maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea.

3 (10) The Department of State's 2021 Traf-
4 ficking in Persons Report states with regard to
5 Libya "trafficking victims—including adults and
6 children—are highly vulnerable to extreme violence
7 and human rights abuses in Libya by governmental
8 and non-state armed groups, including physical, sex-
9 ual, and verbal assault; abduction for ransom; extor-
10 tion; arbitrary killings; inhumane detention; and
11 child soldiering....There is reportedly a high preva-
12 lence of sexual assault and other forms of sexual vio-
13 lence and exploitation of female migrants along the
14 migration routes to Libya and in DCIM-run and mi-
15 litia-run detention facilities in Libya; perpetrators of
16 sexual violence against female migrants include var-
17 ious armed groups, smugglers, traffickers, and MOI
18 officials."

19 (11) A November 2020 Department of Defense
20 Inspector General report estimated there were then
21 approximately 2,000 mercenary forces affiliated with
22 the Wagner Group, a Russian private military com-
23 pany, as well as approximately 2,000 Russian-
24 backed Syrian fighters, advanced equipment, and ad-
25 vanced capabilities supporting Khalifa Haftar's Lib-

1 yan National Army (LNA) and Russian objectives in
2 North Africa. While a number of Russian merce-
3 naries have reportedly left Libya to support oper-
4 ations in Ukraine, Libya remains a logistical hub for
5 Russian operations in sub-Saharan Africa.

6 (12) The January 2020 AFRICOM posture
7 statement claimed, “Russia continues to harvest
8 benefits from the instability in Libya—its military
9 meddling has prolonged the conflict and exacerbated
10 casualties and humanitarian suffering.”.

11 (13) The Department of Defense Inspector
12 General reported in November 2020 that, Turkey
13 then had “hundreds of regular military personnel de-
14 ployed to Libya in order to train GNA-aligned mili-
15 tias and to operate Turkish military equipment” and
16 had sent thousands of Syrian mercenaries to Libya
17 in support of the GNA.

18 (14) On January 19, 2020, at a peace con-
19 ference in Berlin, representatives of the Govern-
20 ments of Algeria, China, Egypt, France, Germany,
21 Italy, Russia, Turkey, the Republic of Congo, the
22 United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and
23 the United States, as well as regional and multilat-
24 eral organizations, agreed to refrain from inter-
25 ference in Libya’s internal affairs, abide by the

1 United Nations arms embargo, and advance a 55-
2 point communique to resolve the conflict in Libya.

3 (15) On February 13, 2020, the United Nation
4 Security Council adopted Resolution 2510, which en-
5 dorses the Conclusions of the International Con-
6 ference on Libya held in Berlin, affirms the need for
7 a lasting ceasefire, demands full compliance by all
8 member states with the United Nations arms embar-
9 go, and expresses unequivocal support for the United
10 Nations Special Representative and the ongoing
11 United Nations Support Mission in Libya
12 (UNSMIL)-facilitated intra-Libyan dialogue.

13 (16) On October 23, 2020, the warring parties
14 in Libya agreed a United Nations-facilitated
15 ceasefire, which called for the withdrawal of all
16 armed forces from conflict lines and the departure of
17 all mercenaries and foreign fighters within three
18 months, and was hailed by United Nations Secretary
19 General Ant'onio Guterres as "a fundamental step
20 toward peace and stability in Libya". As of June 30,
21 2022, the ceasefire has held, but mercenaries and
22 foreign fighters remain in Libya and the United Na-
23 tions Security Council has deployed personnel at
24 Libyans' request to observe the ceasefire under a
25 Libyan led-Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism.

1 (17) In November 2020, the United Nations-or-
2 ganized Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF)
3 reached an agreement on a Roadmap for the Pre-
4 paratory Phase of a Comprehensive Solution to
5 Libya's political crisis, with the objective of
6 strengthening the political legitimacy of Libyan in-
7 stitutions through the holding of presidential and
8 parliamentary elections on a constitutional basis. In
9 February 2021, the LPDF selected a unified interim
10 Libyan executive to lead the country to national elec-
11 tions, and in March 2021, the Libyan House of Rep-
12 resentatives endorsed GNU pursuant to the LPDF
13 Roadmap.

14 (18) The United Nations Security Council
15 urged the GNU to make the necessary preparations
16 for free and fair national presidential and par-
17 liamentary elections to be held on December 24,
18 2021. However, despite United Nations and multi-
19 lateral efforts to help Libyans resolve disputes over
20 constitutional and legal arrangements, Libyan lead-
21 ers indefinitely delayed the planned elections and
22 have yet to agree on a constitutional basis or
23 timeline for conducting them.

24 (19) In February and March 2022, the House
25 of Representatives designated a government to re-

1 place the GNU and outlined its proposed timeline
2 for reaching agreement on constitutional arrange-
3 ments to hold elections, while GNU leaders have
4 stated their refusal to cede authority to anything
5 other than a government chosen following national
6 elections. Tensions between the GNU and HOR-des-
7 ignated governments have persisted, heightening
8 risks of armed confrontation.

9 (20) Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary-Gen-
10 eral Stephanie Williams remains engaged with Liby-
11 an parties to forge agreement on a constitutional
12 basis and timeline for elections, with the United
13 States and other parties supporting Libyan efforts
14 to develop and implement transparent and mutually
15 agreed fiscal mechanisms to support the operations
16 of government until elections are held.

17 (21) On March 4, 2022, the United States
18 joined the Governments of France, Germany, Italy,
19 and the United Kingdom to call on “all actors to re-
20 frain from actions that could undermine stability in
21 Libya”, to “stress that any disagreement on the fu-
22 ture of the political process must be resolved without
23 resorting to violence,” and to affirm a willingness
24 “to hold to account those who threaten stability
25 through violence or incitement”.

1 (22) On April 28, 2022, Ambassador Jeffrey
2 DeLaurentis reaffirmed the United States Govern-
3 ment’s “call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces’
4 fighters and mercenaries from Libya, in line with
5 UN Security Council 2570 and the October 2020
6 Libyan ceasefire agreement” and expressed United
7 States support for “ongoing efforts to build domestic
8 capacity to punish perpetrators of human rights
9 abuses and violations and encourage support for
10 local capacity building and judicial reform in Libya”.

11 (23) Libya’s production of oil has been dis-
12 rupted by political instability, including in April
13 2022 with the closure of Libya’s largest oil field.

14 (24) Since April 2022, representatives of
15 Libya’s two representative chambers have engaged
16 in talks aimed at reaching agreement on holding na-
17 tional elections and determining a pathway forward.

18 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
19 United States—

20 (1) to advance a peaceful resolution to the con-
21 flict in Libya through a United Nations-facilitated
22 Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process as the
23 best way to secure United States interests and to
24 ensure the sovereignty, independence, territorial in-
25 tegrity, and national unity of Libya;

1 (2) to engage regularly at the senior-most levels
2 in support of the continued observance of the
3 ceasefire in Libya, the fair and transparent alloca-
4 tion of Libya’s resources, the reunification of secu-
5 rity and economic institutions, and agreement
6 among Libyans on a consensual constitutional basis
7 that would lead to credible presidential and par-
8 liamentary elections as soon as possible;

9 (3) to support the implementation of United
10 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 (2011)
11 and 1973 (2011), which established an arms embar-
12 go on Libya, and subsequent resolutions modifying
13 and extending the embargo;

14 (4) to enforce Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed.
15 Reg. 23559; relating to blocking property and sus-
16 pending entry into the United States of persons con-
17 tributing to the situation in Libya (April 19, 2016)),
18 designed to target individuals or entities who
19 “threaten the peace, security, and stability of
20 Libya”;

21 (5) to oppose attacks on civilians, medical work-
22 ers, and critical infrastructure, including water sup-
23 plies, in Libya, and to support accountability for
24 those engaged in such heinous actions;

1 (6) to support Libya's sovereignty, independ-
2 ence, territorial integrity, and national unity con-
3 sistent with United Nations Security Council Resolu-
4 tion 2510 (2020) and all predecessor resolutions
5 with respect to Libya, including by—

6 (A) taking action to end the violence and
7 flow of arms;

8 (B) rejecting attempts by any party to il-
9 licitly export Libya's oil; and

10 (C) urging the withdrawal of foreign mili-
11 tary and mercenary forces;

12 (7) to engage in diplomatic relations to convince
13 parties to conflict and political dispute in Libya to
14 support the continuity of the October 2020 ceasefire
15 and persuade foreign powers to withdraw personnel,
16 including mercenaries, weapons, and financing that
17 may reignite or exacerbate conflict;

18 (8) to support political dialogue among Libyans
19 and advance an inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-
20 owned political process;

21 (9) to support the nearly 2.8 million Libyans
22 who registered to vote;

23 (10) to help protect Libya's civilian population
24 and implementing humanitarian and international
25 organizations from the risk of harm resulting from

1 explosive hazards such as landmines, improvised ex-
2 plosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordnance
3 (UXO);

4 (11) to support constant, unimpeded, and reli-
5 able humanitarian access to those in need and to
6 hold accountable those who impede or threaten the
7 delivery of humanitarian assistance;

8 (12) to seek to bring an end to severe forms of
9 trafficking in persons such as slavery, forced labor,
10 and sexual exploitation, including with respect to mi-
11 grants;

12 (13) to advocate for the immediate release and
13 safe evacuations of detained refugees and migrants
14 trapped by the fighting in Libya;

15 (14) to encourage implementation of
16 UNSMIL's plan for the organized and gradual clo-
17 sure of migrant detention centers in Libya;

18 (15) to support greater defense institutional ca-
19 pacity building after a comprehensive political settle-
20 ment;

21 (16) to discourage all parties from heightening
22 tensions in Libya and its environs, through
23 unhelpful and provocative actions.

24 (17) to support current and future democratic
25 development and economic recovery of Libya both

1 during and after a negotiated peaceful political solu-
2 tion, pursuant to Libya's status as a Global Fra-
3 gility Act partner state; and

4 (18) to partner with various U.S. government
5 agencies, multilateral organizations, and local part-
6 ners to strengthen security, prosperity, and stability
7 in Libya, pursuant to Libya's status as a Global
8 Fragility Act partner state.

9 **Subtitle A—Identifying Challenges**
10 **to Stability in Libya**

11 **SEC. 5911. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN**
12 **GOVERNMENTS AND ACTORS IN LIBYA.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
15 in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the
16 Director of National Intelligence, should submit to the ap-
17 propriate congressional committees a report that in-
18 cludes—

19 (1) a description of the full extent of involve-
20 ment in Libya by foreign governments, including the
21 Governments of Russia, Turkey, the United Arab
22 Emirates, Egypt, Sudan, Chad, China, Saudi Ara-
23 bia, and Qatar, including—

24 (A) a description of which governments
25 have conducted or facilitated drone and aircraft

1 strikes in Libya since April 2019 not related to
2 efforts to combat Al Qaeda, the Islamic State,
3 or affiliated entities;

4 (B) a list of the types and estimated
5 amounts of equipment transferred since April
6 2019 by each government described in this
7 paragraph to the parties to conflict in Libya,
8 including foreign military contractors, merce-
9 naries, or paramilitary forces operating in
10 Libya;

11 (C) an estimate of the financial support
12 provided since April 2019 by each government
13 described in this paragraph to the parties to
14 conflict in Libya, including foreign military con-
15 tractors, mercenaries, or paramilitary forces op-
16 erating in Libya; and

17 (D) a description of the activities of any
18 regular, irregular, or paramilitary forces, in-
19 cluding foreign military contractors, mercenary
20 groups, and militias operating inside Libya, at
21 the direction or with the consent of the govern-
22 ments described in this paragraph;

23 (2) an analysis of whether the actions by the
24 governments described in paragraph (1)

1 (A) violate the arms embargo on Libya
2 under United Nations Security Council Resolu-
3 tion 2571 (2021) and predecessor Security
4 Council resolutions;

5 (B) may contribute to violations of inter-
6 national humanitarian law; or

7 (C) involve weapons of United States ori-
8 gin or were in violation of United States end
9 user agreements;

10 (3) a description of United States diplomatic
11 engagement with any governments found to be in
12 violation of the arms embargo regarding strength-
13 ened implementation of the embargo;

14 (4) a list of the specific offending materiel,
15 training, or financial support transfers provided by
16 a government described in paragraph (1) that violate
17 the arms embargo on Libya under United Nations
18 Security Council Resolution 2571 (2021) and prede-
19 cessor Security Council resolutions;

20 (5) an analysis of the activities of foreign
21 armed groups, including the Russian Wagner Group,
22 military contractors and mercenaries employed or
23 engaged by the governments of Turkey and the
24 United Arab Emirates, affiliates of the Islamic State

1 (ISIS), al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
2 and other extremist groups, in Libya;

3 (6) a discussion of whether and to what extent
4 conflict or instability in Libya is enabling the re-
5 cruitment and training efforts of armed groups, in-
6 cluding affiliates of ISIS, AQIM, and other extrem-
7 ist groups;

8 (7) a description of efforts by the European
9 Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
10 and the Arab League, and their respective member
11 states, to implement and enforce the arms embargo
12 and maintain a sustainable ceasefire;

13 (8) a description of any violations of the arms
14 embargo by European Union member states; and

15 (9) a description of United States diplomatic
16 engagement with the European Union, NATO, and
17 the Arab League regarding implementation and en-
18 forcement of the United Nations arms embargo,
19 ceasefire monitoring, and election support.

20 (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
21 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
22 a classified annex.

23 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
24 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
25 sional committees” means—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
2 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
3 House of Representatives; and

4 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
5 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

6 **SEC. 5912. REPORT OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND OBJEC-**
7 **TIVES IN LIBYA.**

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
9 ings:

10 (1) General Stephen Townsend, Commander of
11 United States Africa Command (AFRICOM),
12 warned in January 2020 that in Libya, Russia seeks
13 to “demonstrate itself as an alternative partner to
14 the West” and seeks to position itself alongside the
15 southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
16 zation (NATO).

17 (2) AFRICOM has also stated that the Russian
18 military presence in Libya threatens future United
19 States military partnerships and counterterrorism
20 cooperation by impeding United States access to
21 Libya.

22 (3) On May 29, 2020, AFRICOM reported that
23 the Government of Russia deployed 14 MiG-29 and
24 Su-24 aircraft, SA-22 air defense equipment, and
25 mine-resistant ambush protected armored vehicles to

1 Libya to support Russian state-sponsored private
2 military contractors, including the Wagner Group.

3 (4) In January 2021, United States officials
4 told the international press that mercenaries affili-
5 ated with the Wagner Group were constructing so-
6 phisticated defensive fortifications in central Libya.

7 (5) In April 2021, General Townsend told Con-
8 gress that Russian private military contractors
9 (PMC) “almost certainly downed an unarmed, un-
10 manned U.S. aircraft in Libya in November 2019
11 using a sophisticated Russian air defense system”,
12 and that Russia was “thinly masking their govern-
13 mental activities under the banner of the Wagner
14 Group PMC”.

15 (6) In March 2022, General Townsend cited
16 “longstanding Russian aspirations to establish a per-
17 manent security foothold” in Libya in testimony be-
18 fore Congress.

19 (b) REPORT.—

20 (1) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
22 State, in coordination with the Secretary of the
23 Treasury and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit
24 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
25 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign

1 Relations of the Senate a report that contains an as-
2 sessment of Russian activities and objectives in
3 Libya, including—

4 (A) an assessment of Russian influence
5 and objectives in Libya;

6 (B) the potential threat such activities
7 pose to the United States, southern Europe,
8 NATO, and partners in the Mediterranean Sea
9 and North African region;

10 (C) the direct role of Russia in Libyan fi-
11 nancial affairs, to include issuing and printing
12 currency;

13 (D) Russia's use of mercenaries, military
14 contractors, equipment, and paramilitary forces
15 in Libya;

16 (E) an assessment of sanctions and other
17 policies adopted by United States partners and
18 allies against the Wagner Group and its desta-
19 bilizing activities in Libya, including sanctions
20 on Yevgeny Prigozhin; and

21 (F) an identification of foreign companies
22 and persons that have provided transportation,
23 logistical, administrative, air transit, border
24 crossing, or money transfer services to Russian
25 mercenaries or armed forces operating on be-

1 half of the Russian Government in Libya, and
2 an analysis of whether such entities meet the
3 criteria for imposition of sanctions under sec-
4 tion 1(a) of Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed.
5 Reg. 23559; relating to blocking property and
6 suspending entry into the United States of per-
7 sons contributing to the situation in Libya).

8 (2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
9 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
10 contain a classified annex.

11 **SEC. 5913. DETERMINATION OF SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES**
12 **OF THE LIBYAN NATIONAL ARMY WITH RE-**
13 **SPECT TO SYRIA.**

14 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
15 ment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Com-
16 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
17 and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
18 a list of members of the Libyan National Army (LNA),
19 and details of their activities, that the President deter-
20 mines are knowingly responsible for sanctionable offenses
21 pursuant to—

22 (1) section 7412 of the Caesar Syria Civilian
23 Protection Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 8791 note; 133
24 Stat. 2292); or

1 (2) Executive Order 13582 (76 Fed. Reg.
2 52209; relating to blocking property of the Govern-
3 ment of Syria and prohibiting certain transactions
4 with respect to Syria (August 17, 2011)).

5 **Subtitle B—Actions to Address**
6 **Foreign Intervention in Libya**

7 **SEC. 5921. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PER-**
8 **SONS LEADING, DIRECTING, OR SUPPORTING**
9 **CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INVOLVE-**
10 **MENT IN LIBYA.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
12 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall im-
13 pose each of the sanctions described in section 5924 with
14 respect to each foreign person who the President deter-
15 mines knowingly engages in an activity described in sub-
16 section (b).

17 (b) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A foreign person en-
18 gages in an activity described in this subsection if the per-
19 son leads, directs, or provides significant financial, mate-
20 rial, or technological support to, or knowingly engages in
21 a significant transaction with, a non-Libyan foreign per-
22 son who is—

23 (1) in Libya in a military or commercial capac-
24 ity as a military contractor, mercenary, or part of a
25 paramilitary force; and

1 (2) engaged in significant actions that threaten
2 the peace, security, or stability of Libya.

3 **SEC. 5922. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PER-**
4 **SONS THREATENING THE PEACE OR STA-**
5 **BILITY OF LIBYA.**

6 (a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall
7 impose each of the sanctions described in section 5924
8 with respect to each foreign person on the list required
9 by subsection (b).

10 (b) LIST.—Not later than 180 days after the date
11 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
12 to the appropriate congressional committees a list of—

13 (1) foreign persons, including senior govern-
14 ment officials, militia leaders, paramilitary leaders,
15 and other persons who provide significant support to
16 militia or paramilitary groups in Libya, that the
17 President determines are knowingly—

18 (A) engaged in significant actions or poli-
19 cies that threaten the peace, security, or sta-
20 bility of Libya, including any supply of signifi-
21 cant arms or related materiel in violation of a
22 United Nations Security Council resolution on
23 Libya;

24 (B) engaged in significant actions or poli-
25 cies that obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede,

1 or pose a significant risk of obstructing, under-
2 mining, delaying, or impeding the United Na-
3 tions-mediated political processes that seek a
4 negotiated and peaceful solution to the Libyan
5 crisis, including a consensual constitutional
6 basis that would lead to credible presidential
7 and parliamentary elections as soon as possible
8 and ongoing maintenance of the October 2020
9 ceasefire;

10 (C) engaged in significant actions that may
11 lead to or result in the misappropriation of sig-
12 nificant state assets of Libya;

13 (D) involved in the significant illicit exploi-
14 tation of crude oil or any other natural re-
15 sources in Libya, including the significant illicit
16 production, disruption of production, refining,
17 brokering, sale, purchase, or export of Libyan
18 oil;

19 (E) significantly threatening or coercing
20 Libyan state financial institutions or disrupting
21 the operations of the Libyan National Oil Com-
22 pany; or

23 (F) significantly responsible for actions or
24 policies that are intended to undermine efforts

1 to maintain peace and promote stabilization and
2 economic recovery in Libya;

3 (2) foreign persons who the President deter-
4 mines are successor entities to persons designated
5 for engaging in activities described in subparagraphs
6 (A) through (F) of paragraph (1); and

7 (c) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall submit
8 to the appropriate congressional committees an updated
9 list under subsection (b)—

10 (1) not later than 180 days after the date of
11 the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter
12 for a period of 5 years; or

13 (2) as new information becomes available.

14 (d) FORM.—The list required by subsection (b) shall
15 be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a clas-
16 sified annex.

17 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
18 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
19 sional committees” means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
21 Committee on Financial Services of the House of
22 Representatives; and

23 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
24 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
25 fairs of the Senate.

1 **SEC. 5923. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PER-**
2 **SONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR**
3 **COMPLICIT IN GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTER-**
4 **NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS**
5 **COMMITTED IN LIBYA.**

6 (a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President may
7 impose 5 out of the 12 sanctions described in section 235
8 of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions
9 Act (Public Law 115–44) with respect to each foreign per-
10 son on the list required by subsection (b).

11 (b) LIST OF PERSONS.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
13 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
14 President shall submit to the appropriate congres-
15 sional committees a list of senior foreign persons, in-
16 cluding senior government officials, militia leaders,
17 para-military leaders, and other persons who provide
18 significant support to militia or paramilitary groups
19 in Libya, that the President determines are each
20 knowingly responsible for or complicit in, or have di-
21 rectly or in- directly engaged in, on or after the date
22 of enactment gross violations of internationally rec-
23 ognized human rights committed in Libya.

24 (2) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall
25 submit to the appropriate congressional committees
26 an updated list under paragraph (1)—

1 (A) not later than 180 days after the date
2 of the enactment of this Act and annually
3 thereafter for a period of 5 years; or

4 (B) as new information becomes available.

5 (3) FORM.—The list required by paragraph (1)
6 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
7 clude a classified annex.

8 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
9 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
10 sional committees” means—

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
12 Committee on Financial Services of the House of
13 Representatives; and

14 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
15 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
16 fairs of the Senate.

17 **SEC. 5924. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**

18 (a) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-
19 scribed in this section are the following:

20 (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President
21 may exercise all of the powers granted to the Presi-
22 dent by the International Emergency Economic
23 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that
24 the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50
25 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent nec-

1 essary to block and prohibit all transactions in prop-
2 erty and interests in property of the person if such
3 property and interests in property are in the United
4 States, come within the United States, or are or
5 come within the possession or control of a United
6 States person.

7 (2) INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN INDIVID-
8 UALS.—

9 (A) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMIS-
10 SION,OR PAROLE.—A foreign person who is an
11 individual and who meets any of the criteria de-
12 scribed section 5921 or 5922 may be deter-
13 mined by the Secretary of State to be—

14 (i) inadmissible to the United States;
15 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
16 documentation to enter the United States;
17 and

18 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
19 or paroled into the United States or to re-
20 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-
21 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et
22 seq.).

23 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—A foreign
24 person who is an individual and who meets any

1 of the criteria described section 5921 or 5922
2 may be subject to the following:

3 (i) Revocation of any visa or other
4 entry documentation by the Secretary of
5 State regardless of when the visa or other
6 entry documentation is or was issued.

7 (ii) A revocation under clause (i)
8 shall—

9 (I) take effect immediately in ac-
10 cordance with section 221(i) of the
11 Immigration and Nationality Act, (8
12 U.S.C. 1201(i)); and

13 (II) cancel any other valid visa or
14 entry documentation that is in the
15 foreign person's possession.

16 (b) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in sub-
17 sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
18 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall
19 apply to a person who violates, attempts to violate, con-
20 spires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations issued
21 under section 5926(2) of this title to carry out subsection
22 (a)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a
23 person who commits an unlawful act described in section
24 206(a) of the International Emergency Economic Powers
25 Act.

1 (c) EXCEPTION.—Sanctions under subsection (a)(2)
2 shall not apply to an alien if admitting or paroling the
3 alien into the United States is necessary to permit the
4 United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the
5 Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Suc-
6 cess June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21,
7 1947, between the United Nations and the United States,
8 or other applicable international obligations of the United
9 States.

10 (d) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH NATIONAL SECU-
11 RITY.—The following activities shall be exempt from sanc-
12 tions under this section:

13 (1) Activities subject to the reporting require-
14 ments under title V of the National Security Act of
15 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.).

16 (2) Any authorized intelligence or law enforce-
17 ment activities of the United States.

18 **SEC. 5925. WAIVER.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may
20 waive, for one or more periods not to exceed 90 days, the
21 application of sanctions imposed on a foreign person under
22 this subtitle if the President—

23 (1) determines and reports to Congress that
24 such a waiver is in the national interest of the
25 United States; and

1 (2) thereafter submits to the appropriate con-
2 gressional committees a justification for such waiver.

3 (b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
4 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
5 gressional committees” means—

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
7 Committee on Financial Services of the House of
8 Representatives; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
10 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
11 fairs of the Senate.

12 **SEC. 5926. IMPLEMENTATION AND REGULATORY AUTHOR-**
13 **ITY.**

14 The President—

15 (1) is authorized to exercise all authorities pro-
16 vided to the President under sections 203 and 205
17 of the International Emergency Economic Powers
18 Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this
19 title; and

20 (2) shall issue such regulations, licenses, and
21 orders as are necessary to carry out this title.

22 **SEC. 5927. EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF**
23 **GOODS.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and requirements
25 to impose sanctions under this subtitle shall not include

1 the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the
2 importation of goods.

3 (b) GOOD DEFINED.—In this section, the term
4 “good” means any article, natural or man-made sub-
5 stance, material, supply or manufactured product, includ-
6 ing inspection and test equipment and excluding technical
7 data.

8 **SEC. 5928. DEFINITIONS.**

9 In this subtitle:

10 (1) ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms “admitted”
11 and “alien” have the meanings given those terms in
12 section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
13 (8 U.S.C. 1101).

14 (2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
15 son” means an individual or entity who is not a
16 United States person.

17 (3) FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.—The term “for-
18 eign government” means any government of a coun-
19 try other than the United States.

20 (4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” with
21 respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,
22 means that a person has actual knowledge, or should
23 have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the
24 result.

1 (5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
2 “United States person” means—

3 (A) an individual who is a United States
4 citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
5 nent residence to the United States;

6 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
7 the United States or any jurisdiction within the
8 United States, including a foreign branch of
9 such an entity; or

10 (C) any person in the United States.

11 (6) GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY
12 RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS.—The term “gross vio-
13 lations of internationally recognized human rights”
14 has the meaning given such term in section
15 502B(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
16 (22 U.S.C. 2304(d)(1)).

17 **SEC. 5929. SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President may suspend in
19 whole or in part the imposition of sanctions otherwise re-
20 quired under this subtitle for periods not to exceed 90
21 days if the President determines that the parties to the
22 conflict in Libya have agreed to and are upholding a sus-
23 tainable, good-faith ceasefire in support of a lasting polit-
24 ical solution in Libya.

1 (b) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 30
2 days after the date on which the President makes a deter-
3 mination to suspend the imposition of sanctions as de-
4 scribed in subsection (a), the President shall submit to the
5 appropriate congressional committees a notification of the
6 determination.

7 (c) REIMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Any sanctions
8 suspended under subsection (a) shall be reimposed if the
9 President determines that the criteria described in that
10 subsection are no longer being met.

11 **SEC. 5930. SUNSET.**

12 The requirement to impose sanctions under this sub-
13 title shall cease to be effective on December 31, 2026.

14 **Subtitle C—Assistance for Libya**

15 **SEC. 5931. HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR THE PEOPLE OF**
16 **LIBYA AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEES AND**
17 **MIGRANTS IN LIBYA.**

18 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that—

20 (1) the United States Government should, in-
21 cluding in alignment with Libya’s status inclusion in
22 the U.S. Global Fragility Act Strategy—

23 (A) continue senior-level efforts to address
24 humanitarian needs in Libya, which has been

1 exacerbated by conflict and the COVID-19 pan-
2 demic;

3 (B) engage diplomatically with Libyan en-
4 tities to guarantee constant, reliable humani-
5 tarian access by frontline providers in Libya;

6 (C) engage diplomatically with the Libyan
7 entities, the United Nations, and the European
8 Union to encourage the voluntary safe passage
9 of detained vulnerable migrants and refugees
10 from the conflict zones in Libya; and

11 (D) support efforts to document and pub-
12 licize gross violations of internationally recog-
13 nized human rights and international humani-
14 tarian law, including efforts related to severe
15 forms of trafficking in persons such as slavery,
16 forced labor, and sexual exploitation, and hold
17 perpetrators accountable; and

18 (2) deliver humanitarian assistance targeted to-
19 ward those most in need and delivered through part-
20 ners that uphold internationally recognized humani-
21 tarian principles, with robust monitoring to ensure
22 assistance is reaching intended beneficiaries.

23 (b) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—The Administrator
24 of the United States Agency for International Develop-
25 ment, in coordination with the Secretary of State, should

1 continue to support humanitarian assistance to individuals
2 and communities in Libya, including—

3 (1) health assistance, including logistical and
4 technical assistance to hospitals, ambulances, and
5 health clinics in affected communities, including mi-
6 grant communities, and provision of basic public
7 health commodities, including support for an effec-
8 tive response to the COVID-19 pandemic;

9 (2) services, such as medicines and medical sup-
10 plies and equipment;

11 (3) assistance to provide—

12 (A) protection, food, and shelter, including
13 to migrant communities;

14 (B) water, sanitation, and hygiene (com-
15 monly referred to as “WASH”); and

16 (C) resources and training to increase com-
17 munications and education to help communities
18 slow the spread of COVID-19 and to increase
19 vaccine acceptance; and

20 (4) technical assistance to ensure health, food,
21 and commodities are appropriately selected, pro-
22 cured, targeted, monitored, and distributed.

23 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the
24 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
25 in coordination with the Administrator of the United

1 States Agency for International Development, shall submit
2 to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy on
3 the following:

4 (1) How the United States, working with rel-
5 evant foreign governments and multilateral organiza-
6 tions, plans to address the humanitarian situation in
7 Libya.

8 (2) Diplomatic efforts by the United States to
9 encourage strategic burden-sharing and the coordi-
10 nation of donations with international donors, in-
11 cluding foreign governments and multilateral organi-
12 zations to advance the provision of humanitarian as-
13 sistance to the people of Libya and international mi-
14 grants and refugees in Libya.

15 (3) How to address humanitarian access chal-
16 lenges and ensure protection for vulnerable refugees
17 and migrants, including protection from severe
18 forms of trafficking in persons such as slavery,
19 forced labor, and sexual exploitation.

20 (4) How the United States is mitigating risk,
21 utilizing third party monitors, and ensuring effective
22 delivery of assistance.

23 (5) How to address the tragic and persistent
24 deaths of migrants and refugees at sea and human
25 trafficking.

1 (d) INTEGRATION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE-LED
2 STABILIZATION EFFORTS.—

3 (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of
4 Congress that the Secretary of State, working with
5 United States allies, international organizations, and
6 implementing partners, including local implementing
7 partners, to the extent practicable, should continue
8 coordinated international stabilization efforts in
9 Libya to—

10 (A) build up the capacity of implementers
11 and national mine action authorities engaged in
12 conventional weapons destruction efforts and
13 mine risk education training and programs; and

14 (B) conduct operational clearance of explo-
15 sive remnants of war resulting from the 2011
16 revolution and current military conflict in
17 Libya, including in territory previously occupied
18 by ISIS-Libya, and particularly in areas where
19 unexploded ordnance, booby traps, and anti-per-
20 sonnel and anti-vehicle mines contaminate areas
21 of critical infrastructure and large housing dis-
22 tricts posing a risk of civilian casualties.

23 (2) IN GENERAL.—To the maximum extent
24 practicable, humanitarian assistance authorized
25 under subsection (b) and the strategy required by

1 subsection (c) shall take into account and integrate
2 Department of State-led stabilization efforts—

3 (A) to address—

4 (i) contamination from landmines and
5 other explosive remnants of war left from
6 the 2011 revolution and current military
7 conflict in Libya, including in territory pre-
8 viously occupied by ISIS-Libya; and

9 (ii) proliferation of illicit small arms
10 and light weapons resulting from such con-
11 flict and the destabilizing impact the pro-
12 liferation of such weapons has in Libya
13 and neighboring countries; and

14 (B) to mitigate the threat that destruction
15 of conventional weapons poses to development,
16 the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the
17 safe and secure return of internally displaced
18 persons.

19 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
20 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
21 sional committees” means—

22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
23 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
24 resentatives; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
2 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

3 **SEC. 5932. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE,**
4 **ELECTIONS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State should co-
6 ordinate United States Government efforts to—

7 (1) work with the United Nations Support Mis-
8 sion in Libya and transitional authorities in Libya to
9 prepare for national elections, as called for by the
10 Libyan Political Dialogue, and a subsequent political
11 transition;

12 (2) support efforts to resolve the current civil
13 conflict in Libya;

14 (3) work to help the people of Libya and a fu-
15 ture Libyan government develop functioning, unified
16 Libyan economic, security, and governing institu-
17 tions;

18 (4) work to ensure free, fair, inclusive, and
19 credible elections organized by an independent and
20 effective High National Elections Commission in
21 Libya, including through supporting electoral secu-
22 rity and international election observation and by
23 providing training and technical assistance to insti-
24 tutions with election-related responsibilities, as ap-
25 propriate;

1 (5) work with the people of Libya, nongovern-
2 mental organizations, and Libya institutions to
3 strengthen democratic governance, reinforce civilian
4 institutions and support decentralization, in line
5 with relevant Libyan laws and regulations, in order
6 to address community grievances, promote social co-
7 hesion, mitigate drivers of violent extremism, and
8 help communities recover from Islamic State occupa-
9 tion;

10 (6) defend against gross violations of inter-
11 nationally recognized human rights in Libya, includ-
12 ing by supporting efforts to document such viola-
13 tions;

14 (7) to combat corruption and improve the
15 transparency and accountability of Libyan govern-
16 ment institutions; and

17 (8) to support the efforts of independent media
18 outlets to broadcast, distribute, and share informa-
19 tion with the Libyan people.

20 (b) RISK MITIGATION AND ASSISTANCE MONI-
21 TORING.—The Secretary of State and Administrator of
22 the United States Agency for International Development
23 should ensure that appropriate steps are taken to mitigate
24 risk of diversion of assistance for Libya and ensure reli-
25 able third-party monitoring is utilized for projects in Libya

1 that United States Government personnel are unable to
2 access and monitor.

3 (c) REPORT.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
5 after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
6 in coordination with the Administrator of the United
7 States Agency for International Development, should
8 submit to the appropriate congressional committees
9 a report on the activities carried out under sub-
10 section (a).

11 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
12 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
13 propriate congressional committees” means—

14 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
15 the Committee on Appropriations of the House
16 of Representatives; and

17 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
18 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
19 Senate.

20 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be
22 appropriated \$30,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 to
23 carry out subsection (a).

24 (2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—Any ex-
25 penditure of amounts made available to carry out

1 subsection (a) shall be subject to the notification re-
2 quirements applicable to—

3 (A) expenditures from the Economic Sup-
4 port Fund under section 531(c) of the Foreign
5 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346(c));
6 and

7 (B) expenditures from the Development
8 Assistance Fund under section 653(a) of the
9 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 16
10 2413(a)).

11 **SEC. 5933. ENGAGING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTI-**
12 **TUTIONS TO ADVANCE LIBYAN ECONOMIC**
13 **RECOVERY AND IMPROVE PUBLIC SECTOR**
14 **FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury
16 should instruct the United States Executive Director at
17 each international financial institution to use the voice,
18 vote, and influence of the United States to support, in a
19 way that is consistent with broader United States national
20 interests, a Libyan-led process to develop a framework for
21 the economic recovery of Libya and improved public sector
22 financial management, complementary to United Nations-
23 led peace efforts and in support of democratic institutions
24 and the rule of law in Libya.

1 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—To the extent con-
2 sistent with broader United States national interests, the
3 framework described in subsection (a) should include the
4 following policy proposals:

5 (1) To restore, respect, and safeguard the in-
6 tegrity, unity, and lawful governance of Libya’s key
7 economic ministries and institutions, in particular
8 the Central Bank of Libya, the Libya Investment
9 Authority, the National Oil Corporation, and the
10 Audit Bureau (AB).

11 (2) To improve the accountability and effective-
12 ness of Libyan authorities, including sovereign eco-
13 nomic institutions, in providing services and oppor-
14 tunity to the Libyan people.

15 (3) To assist in improving public financial man-
16 agement and reconciling the public accounts of na-
17 tional financial institutions and letters of credit
18 issued by private Libyan financial institutions as
19 needed pursuant to a political process.

20 (4) To restore the production, efficient manage-
21 ment, and development of Libya’s oil and gas indus-
22 tries so such industries are resilient against disrup-
23 tion, including malign foreign influence, and can
24 generate prosperity on behalf of the Libyan people.

1 (5) To promote the development of private sec-
2 tor enterprise.

3 (6) To improve the transparency and account-
4 ability of public sector employment and wage dis-
5 tribution.

6 (7) To strengthen supervision of and reform of
7 Libyan financial institutions.

8 (8) To eliminate exploitation of price controls
9 and market distorting subsidies in the Libyan econ-
10 omy.

11 (9) To support opportunities for United States
12 businesses.

13 (c) CONSULTATION.—In supporting the framework
14 described in subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury
15 should instruct the United States Executive Director at
16 each international financial institution to encourage the
17 institution to consult with relevant stakeholders in the fi-
18 nancial, governance, and energy sectors.

19 (d) DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL IN-
20 STITUTION.—In this section, the term “international fi-
21 nancial institution” means the International Monetary
22 Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
23 opment, European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
24 ment, International Development Association, Inter-
25 national Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment

1 Guarantee Agency, African Development Bank, African
2 Development Fund, Asian Development Bank, Inter-
3 American Development Bank, Bank for Economic Co-
4 operation and Development in the Middle East and North
5 Africa, and Inter-American Investment Corporation.

6 (e) TERMINATION.—The requirements of this section
7 shall cease to be effective on December 31, 2026.

8 **SEC. 5934. RECOVERING ASSETS STOLEN FROM THE LIBY-**
9 **AN PEOPLE.**

10 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
12 Treasury, and the Attorney General should, to the extent
13 practicable, advance a coordinated international effort—

14 (1) to carry out special financial investigations
15 to identify and track assets taken from the people
16 and institutions of Libya through theft, corruption,
17 money laundering, or other illicit means; and

18 (2) to work with foreign governments—

19 (A) to share financial investigations intel-
20 ligence, as appropriate;

21 (B) to oversee the assets identified pursu-
22 ant to paragraph (1); and

23 (C) to provide technical assistance to help
24 governments establish the necessary legal
25 framework to carry out asset forfeitures.

1 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The coordinated inter-
2 national effort described in subsection (a) should include
3 input from—

4 (1) the Office of Terrorist Financing and Fi-
5 nancial Crimes of the Department of the Treasury;

6 (2) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
7 of the Department of the Treasury; and

8 (3) the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery
9 Section of the Department of Justice.

10 **SEC. 5935. AUTHORITY TO EXPAND EDUCATIONAL AND**
11 **CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH**
12 **LIBYA.**

13 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
14 gress that the United States should expand educational
15 and cultural exchange programs with Libya to promote
16 mutual understanding and people-to-people linkages be-
17 tween the United States and Libya.

18 (b) AUTHORITY.—The President is authorized to ex-
19 pand educational and cultural exchange programs with
20 Libya, including programs carried out under the following:

21 (1) The J. William Fulbright Educational Ex-
22 change Program referred to in paragraph (1) of sec-
23 tion 112(a) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural
24 Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2460(a)).

1 (2) The International Visitors Program referred
2 to in paragraph (3) of such section.

3 (3) The U.S.–Middle East Partnership Initia-
4 tive (MEPI) Student Leaders Program.

5 (4) The Youth Exchange and Study Program.

6 (5) Other related programs administered by the
7 Department of State.

